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INTRODUCTION
Insights from a National Conference:
"Conflicts of Interest in the
Practice of Medicine"
Aaron S. Kesselheim and David Orentlicher
he practice of medicine is indelibly intertwined
with the personal interests of the people and
institutions deliver g the care. Doctors and
hospital executives worry about the physical and men-
tal health of their patients, but they also worry about
the financial health of their families and institutions.
For-profit pharmaceutical and medical device compa-
nies seek to develop important new medical technolo-
gies, but also have a responsibility to their sharehold-
ers.' Conflicts of interest are inevitable and pervasive
in our health care system. And while they can promote
better patient care, they also can compromise patient
well-being. When surgeons are rewarded with royal-
ties for their innovative devices, they are more likely
to develop better devices, but they also may favor their
own devices over alternative and better options.2
Financial conflicts may be the most common and
troubling kinds of conflicts of interest, but other con-
flicts are important as well. For example, the pursuit
of professional recognition may divert the attention
of health care providers from serving the interests of
their patients.3
In the past, fee-for-service reimbursement for indi-
vidual doctors represented the dominant source of
financial conflicts,' and it still plays a major role in
the problem of conflicts." But changes in health care
organization have multiplied the kinds of conflicts of
interest. The era of the solo or even small group prac-
titioner is nearing its close; physicians now commonly
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practice in large partnerships, often spanning special-
ties and offering an increasingly broad range of ser-
vices such as laboratory and radiological studies and
dispensation of prescription drugs. These complex
practice groups may make care delivery more con-
venient and effective for patients, but these arrange-
ments have also been associated with overutilization
and excessive costs.6 Mergers of solo hospitals into
health care systems have raised controversy by offer-
ing increasingly sophisticated and cutting-edge ser-
vices - at high cost to patients and payers - without
always having supporting evidence of the efficacy of
these procedures.7
Conflicts are common as well in medical research.
Pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers
frequently partner with academic medical centers,
researchers, and physicians to develop and test prod-
ucts intended to improve patient management. Many
important therapies have resulted from these partner-
ships. However recent studies have shown that sources
of financial support in biomedical research can unduly
influence the design of studies and the reporting of the
study results., In the past decade, numerous drug and
device manufacturers have been investigated for pro-
moting their products for indications lacking evidence
of efficacy, behavior that is driven at least in part by
the potential for large revenues from these uses.9
As these examples show, policymakers must take
conflicts of interest seriously and draw the best bal-
ance between their benefits and harms. Conflicts can-
not and should not be eliminated, but they need to be
identified and managed. Otherwise, they risk com-
promising, rather than enhancing, the quality of our
health care system.
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Defining Conflicts of Interest
According to Dennis Thompson, the phrase "con-
flict of interest" refers to a set of conditions in which
professional judgment concerning a primary inter-
est is vulnerable to undue influence by a secondary
interest.1o Few would deny that a driving interest of
practitioners, researchers, and hospitals is providing
effective health care to patients. However, the second-
ary interest arising from financial and other personal
interests can affect how that care is provided. Even
when personal interests do not actually exert any
medical center environments. Finally, we identified
a range of ideas for moving forward to address con-
flicts of interest in medical practice arising from the
diverse points of view represented at the conference.
This journal issue represents one intended output of
the conference, and features scholarly works emerging
from the remarks of some of the key participants.
The conference was generously funded by a grant
from the Highmark Foundation of Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania, with additional funding contributed by the
Jewish Healthcare Foundation, the University of
As conflicts of interest in medicine have become points of increasing concern
among patients, policymakers, and members of the health care profession,
innovative perspectives on managing conflicts of interest in medicine
have emerged from many corners, including medicine, law, economics
and other social sciences. We had the opportunity to organize a conference
on behalf of the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics (ASLME)
to bring members of these disparate fields together to share their ideas about
conflicts of interest in the practice of medicine. The goal of the conference
was to foster ideas and shape future policies on the topic of conflicts.
influence, perceptions that such an influence could
exist can be a powerful force that reduces confidence
in a health care provider or institution."
As conflicts of interest in medicine have become
points of increasing concern among patients, policy-
makers, and members of the health care profession,
innovative perspectives on managing conflicts of
interest in medicine have emerged from many cor-
ners, including medicine, law, economics and other
social sciences. We had the opportunity to organize
a conference on behalf of the American Society of
Law, Medicine & Ethics (ASLME) to bring members
of these disparate fields together to share their ideas
about conflicts of interest in the practice of medicine.
The goal of the conference was to foster ideas and
shape future policies on the topic of conflicts.
Held in October 2011, the conference proceeded
in three main parts. First, we reviewed the issue of
whether conflicts of interest matter in medical prac-
tice, including an evaluation of the current state of the
evidence and knowledge about the various barriers to
reform. Second, we discussed how principles of con-
flict of interest management are applied to some of the
most complicated questions in medical practice, such
as delivery of innovative care using medical devices
and balancing financial relationships within academic
Pittsburgh Health Sciences, and by the University of
Pittsburgh School of Law. Outstanding support also
was provided by Ted Hutchinson and Katie Johnson
at ASLME and from the conference advisory commit-
tee comprising Eric Campbell, Steven Joffe, Bernard
Lo, George Loewenstein, Alan Meisel, Kevin Outter-
son, and William Sage.
Addressing Conflicts of Interest in Medicine
Numerous ideas have been offered that intend to
address conflicts of interest in medicine that arise
out of the personal interests of health care research-
ers and providers. Most of the attention has focused
on financial relationships, and some experts have
advocated separating medical practice and commer-
cialization with the goal of eliminating the relation-
ships that cause conflicts of interest. As former New
England Journal ofMedicine editor Arnold Relman
put it, "Physicians should not accept the industrializa-
tion of medical care, but should work instead toward
major reforms that will restore the health care system
to its proper role as a social service that society pro-
vides to all." Industry advocates have decried efforts
to focus attention on financial relationships, calling
efforts to regulate conflicts of interest "a pejorative,
framing bias" that seeks to "eliminate, reduce, mini-
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mize or disclose, rather than proliferate, increase and
maximize."'3
Available data expose the flaws in both of these
arguments. As Bernard Lo points out in his article,'
partnerships between pharmaceutical companies and
academic researchers have led to the development of
innovative and important drugs. However, it is impos-
sible to ignore the negative outcomes from conflicts
of interest. Lo also provides a comprehensive review
of evidence showing that conflicts of interest can lead
to biased evaluations of study drugs on the part of
researchers and the for-profit companies sponsoring
them. In many cases, the biased evaluations resulted
in patient harm.
But while financial relationships can lead to harm-
ful outcomes, eliminating them completely is essen-
tially impossible.'1 Therefore, we must navigate in the
middle. How do we decide which financial relation-
ships are permissible and which are not? For those
relationships that are permissible, what kinds of safe-
guards are needed to protect against undue influence
from the conflicts of interest that arise? For example,
is it sufficient for physicians to disclose permissible
conflicts to their patients, or are other steps needed?
Addressing these considerations, a number
of important themes were developed during the
conference:
1. Conflicts of interest really do matter.
While some might argue that financial consid-
erations do not influence physician decision
making, the evidence shows otherwise. In the
systematic review performed by Christopher
Robertson, et al.,16 numerous studies provide
good reason to believe that conflicts matter.
For example, after physicians purchase an MRI
scanner for their practice, they prescribe more
scans. In addition, orthopedic surgeons who buy
an ownership stake in a hospital perform more
complicated, more expensive operations and
fewer less complicated, less expensive opera-
tions. And physician-owners of ambulatory sur-
gery centers tend to refer Medicaid patients to
the hospital for care while referring patients with
private insurance or Medicare coverage to their
own center.
Robertson and colleagues also showed
how conflicts influence the performance and
outcomes of medical research. When a com-
pany funds a study of one of its own products,
research and substantial experience show that
the study is more likely to support use of the
product in question. Thus, patients may be
harmed before the bias in the original research
can be identified and corrected.
In addition to financial conflicts, nonfinancial
conflicts also matter. As Richard Saver explains,7
recent attention to financial relationships and
the conflicts they create may lead policymakers
to assume that in the absence of these monetary
connections, conflicts of interest cannot exist.
However, Thompson's definition of conflicts of
interest makes no reference to the source of the
conflict - indeed, personal or political interests
also can constitute the secondary interest. Saver
provides evidence of the impact of these nonfi-
nancial conflicts and describes how lack of rec-
ognition of their effects creates negative spillover
that also weakens financial conflicts regulation.
2. Experts and institutions have been placing too great
a weight on disclosure as a remedy for conflicts of
interest.
The most common response to medical conflicts
of interest is disclosure. Most medical journals
now require financial disclosure statements,'" a
growing number of academic medical centers
require central reporting of faculty members'
financial relationships,'9 and the Affordable
Care Act includes a sunshine provision that will
require reporting and public disclosure of all
industry payments to physicians by 2014.20
However, as Sunita Sah discusses,21 disclosure
has perils of its own. Disclosure of conflicts of
interest may place too much of the burden on the
subject of the disclosure to police conflicts. Phy-
sicians reading their colleagues' disclosure state-
ments in medical journals may disregard the
disclosure, or paradoxically assign greater weight
to the recommendations by assuming that mul-
tiple relationships are a sign of expertise. Disclo-
sure can also make physicians more willing to
place themselves in conflicted positions. Once a
conflict has been disclosed, some physicians rea-
son, they have met their ethical obligations and
therefore are free to be in the conflicted posi-
tion. Finally, patients may not properly respond
to the existence of a financial relationship when
deciding whether it should affect their choice of
physician or their willingness to agree to their
physicians' recommendations. In her article, Sah
describes studies showing that while patients
worry when their physicians have conflicts, they
also are reluctant to act on their concerns for
fear that their physicians will recognize that they
do not fully trust the physicians.
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3. It is not clear how much we should rely on profes-
sional self-regulation and how much we should rely on
legal regulation of financial relationships in medicine.
Professional regulations are easier than laws to
revise, and they reinforce a culture of account-
ability and professional responsibility. Robert
Steinbrook and Bernard Lo describe one area
of professional self-regulation by examining
in-depth how medical journal editors evalu-
ate and try to regulate the existence of financial
relationships among the authors of the articles
they publish.22 Medical journals fulfill a central
role in the health care system as the primary
forum for critical evaluation and dissemination
of knowledge. Thus, editors are often at the front
lines of financial disclosure controversies. Slowly,
medical journals have been adopting regulatory
practices such as full disclosure reporting (often
in lengthy on-line supplements) and exclusion
of authors or reviewers with financial relation-
ships from certain article types. Steinbrook and
Lo provide suggestions for additional regulatory
steps.
But professional self-regulation has its limits.
It is difficult for any profession to police itself
adequately. Accordingly, it is common for legisla-
tors, courts or governmental agencies to supple-
ment professional self-regulation with extrinsic
regulation. For example, Kate Greenwood and
colleagues describe a process of externally-
organized training and compliance programs
for physician-scientists, and conclude that such
requirements could help promote a culture of
openness and greater understand of the impor-
tance of accounting for potentially conflicting
relationships.23
However, legal regulation has drawbacks
too. It can become too complicated and gener-
ate unintended consequences. 24 As Lo observes,
complying with conflicts of interest paperwork
can be cumbersome and time-consuming. Physi-
cians also may have to spend a good deal of time
explaining the value of their financial relation-
ships to suspicious patients or reporters. With
such burdens, physicians may find it desirable
to forego even beneficial financial relationships.
Regulation can have other unintended conse-
quences. As mentioned above, Sah found that
disclosure can make physicians more willing to
place themselves in conflicted positions.
4. It may not be appropriate to place the "burden of
proof" on those seeking greater oversight of financial
relationships.
It is generally assumed that proponents of regu-
lation should demonstrate the value of their
proposed regulations before they are imposed
on physicians or industry. But it may make more
sense to require opponents of such regulation to
prove that a regulation would be harmful before
it is rejected. This is particularly salient as more
and more studies provide very good reason to
believe that conflicts of interest can compromise
the quality of medical research and the judgment
of physicians.
There are other good reasons to place the
burden of proof on opponents of oversight of
conflicts. Because of their access to funding and
relevant data, industry is much more able than
others to secure evidence on the benefits and
burdens of conflicts. We need better data on the
benefits and harms of different types of conflicts,
and of proposed remedies, before we can reliably
assess their impact. Another important reason
for placing the burden of proof on industry lies
in the fact that industry has created the con-
flicts problem. It therefore should have greater
responsibility to limit harms from its creation.
In his article, Marc Rodwin examines how the
emphasis of conflict of interest regulation too
often falls on physicians rather than on the drug
and device companies that often create and
dictate these financial relationships. 25 Perhaps
society could best address the conflicts of inter-
est dilemmas by reducing corrupting practices at
those institutions.
Next Steps
The Pittsburgh conference was designed to promote
better understanding of conflicts of interest, greater
discussion of the problems that conflicts cause in
health care delivery, and more effective measures to
manage conflicts. As conference organizers, we hope
that the attendees, as well as the ASLME and the
Highmark Foundation, were inspired to continue to
push for sensible policies and reforms in this area to
ensure that patients realize more of the benefits and
fewer of the harms from financial relationships that
are inevitable in the U.S. health care system.
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